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Evidently such a program will result in one thing only, a philosophy in the legitimate and historical sense of the word. Our method, to be sure, will be that of science—that is to say, logical analysis—but only because this is the only possible mode of discursive thought. And our terms will all be ponderable entities with which science can and does deal. But our questions will not be those of any science. We ask how knowledge is possible and what are the norms of the good life. And our replies will be worked out in terms of actual fact, in terms of knowledge as it actually arises and life as it is actually lived.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy. BERNARD BOSANQUET. Macmillan. 1921. Pp. xxviii + 220.

Dr. Bosanquet's volume, in spite of its comparative brevity, is unusually comprehensive and suggestive; first because his survey of the current conflicting types of thought bears the stamp of his exceptionally wide knowledge and clear insight, and further on account of the highly interesting developments which, in his opinion, must mark the future. "You are no longer taking a single bearing with a single compass, but covering a whole region with a systematic survey" (p. ix). This interest centers—as may be inferred from his title—in something approaching paradox. For his analysis of the present situation is directed to show that the opposed schools whose vigorous polemics animate modern speculation share so much in common that they really are—often unconsciously—allies rather than antagonists, and the explicit principles which mark their divergence have implicit consequences which logically lead to a convergence that is still more fundamental; and thus the perspectives of philosophy are completely transformed. This result springs mainly from the rapidly changing character of philosophic discussion; it is becoming subtler, more refined, and the old "bombardment at long ranges" has given place to "sapping and mining" (p. vii). Whither this concealed activity leads and where the next explosion will occur thus constitute fascinating problems. I venture to add that in my opinion Dr. Bosanquet's own position on several fundamental points seems to be more clearly expressed than in his earlier volumes—with regard to sense-data, the relation between existence and thought, and between philosophy and religion; but this again is merely the more explicit formulation of what has always been implicit in the author's idealism.

This ground of agreement, however, is to be found not in mere devotion to truth or sincerity of conviction. The trenchancy of the "extremes" is well illustrated by the case which first attracted the author's notice—"the startling difference and agreement" between Italian neo-idealism, and the neo-realism of Professor Drake and his collaborators, together with Dr. Alexander (p. viii); between the system for which "reality is thinking," and "being" or "mind" are "mutually contradictory terms," and that which asserts the non-mental nature of reality.¹ It would be unfair to summarize Dr. Bosanquet's treatment of the basis wherein he finds the identity of these antithetical standpoints; it must suffice to draw attention to the degree of their divergence as one indication of the fresh interest which his analysis gives to the issues involved; I shall refer to an equally striking instance later.

The readers of this JOURNAL will probably be mainly concerned with the attitude taken up by the writer, as representing an old and established type of idealism which has in recent decades aroused a good deal of vigorous criticism, towards American neo-realism. I ventured recently to express the opinion that nothing "prevents realism from taking its place within a system of absolute idealism";² and it appears to me that this suggestion finds much to support it in Dr. Bosanquet's volume. He accords the fullest recognition to the value of the arguments advanced by the realists. "Speculative philosophy welcomes the assertion that the world of sense-perception has being in its own right. . . . Hegel's and Green's position is that a chair is a chair right enough. . . . The speculative philosopher recognizes as a comrade the neo-realist who demands a place for all that sense-perception has to give us" (pp. 2, 5, 7).³ I think all realists will agree that this, in connection with the detailed discussion of the relation between thought and existence in Chap. IV, is sufficiently definite; it detracts, further, very much from the weight of the adverse criticism to which I have just alluded, which has always seemed to me completely to ignore the true absolutist standpoint towards these problems. Dr. Bosanquet, of course, proceeds to indicate the difficulties which realism has to face; these may be best summed up in his statement that "sensa may exist *per se*, but we can not get them so" (p. 13), and in the conclusions which he draws from this; but these will doubtless re-

¹ Gentile, *Theory of Mind as Pure Act*, pp. 56, 19. Drake, *Essays in Critical Realism*.

² This JOURNAL, March 16, 1922, p. 157.

³ Cf. p. 75; "the neo-realist . . . building the foundations of that speculative philosophy whose super-structure already exists . . . they enrich and amend it."

ceive due attention from the writers most directly concerned; and not the least interesting of their comments will surely be their reaction to the alliance which Dr. Bosanquet discerns between the critical school and Mr. Bradley in "the parallel movement between absolutism" and critical realism, and the analogy which persists even beyond "the point at which, *primâ facie*, they sharply diverge" (pp. 127-130). The divergent principles are, naturally, repudiated—the critical realist "analysis is a fundamental error" (p. 137); and I may be permitted to express my pleasure in finding that Dr. Bosanquet regards the complete critical theory as involving a noumenalism akin to Kant's—a position that I have myself attempted to substantiate.⁴ Thus the tangle of "isms" presents yet another "meeting of extremes"—in this instance a "common error, the confusion of transcendence of experience and transcendence of immediacy," characteristic equally of American critical realism and Italian neo-idealism (p. 149).

Next in degree of interest is the author's brief discussion of the philosophical bearings of the relativity theory; here again I am glad to find that, in his opinion, "the moral of relativity is not the permeation of the universe by mind or minds" (p. 16). This conclusion, or one closely analogous to it, has undoubtedly unduly imposed itself upon current philosophic thought, and been adopted as a fresh basis, if not indeed the final proof, of various modes of subjectivism. Such inferences, in my opinion, are altogether groundless, and Dr. Bosanquet's analysis of the subject may be recommended to the many who desire to apprehend the real value of this latest Copernican transformation in scientific theories. The philosophical aspects of the problem center in the nature of space-time. Dr. Bosanquet emphasizes the importance of the relation between "our primitive sense of time" and "uniform time," and concludes that "the spatio-temporal universe (has) no single space-time of its own" (pp. 152-154). Whether this is true or not appears to me to depend on the distinction between the scientific concept of the (physical) universe, and the absolutist (or idealist) conception of the Whole. The first seems to demand a universal, common, basal space-time of which the varying "relativity" systems are all subsidiary aspects depending upon their relevant physical conditions; or as Lord Haldane has expressed this, "change in standpoint gives

⁴ "It is futile to maintain that [the object of thought] is not a *Ding-an-sich*" (p. 146). Cf. *The Monist*, July, 1922; "The Failure of Critical Realism."

⁵ *The Reign of Relativity*, p. 402. I may refer to a fuller discussion of the subject in *Mind*, Jan., 1922, p. 40.

no change in the actual.”⁵ If, on the other hand, we advance to the profounder philosophical distinction “between time in the Absolute and the Absolute in time,”⁶ then it becomes possible to accept Dr. Bosanquet’s suggestion of the space-time-lessness of the Whole.⁷

The nature of time, further, presents us with what is perhaps the most striking of all “extremes”—the connection between time itself and the widest aspects of ethics and religion. For time is an element in all evolution or development; and hence arises “the ultimate crux of speculation; the place of time, progress, and change in the universe” (p. 125). In facing these issues, argues Dr. Bosanquet, modern philosophy stands at a parting of the ways. “The sentiment of religion,” to begin with, “begins in its own right, though it has an intimate relation, but one never passing into identity, with morality”; this position provides a common basis for “Alexander the realist, James the radical empiricist, and Bradley the absolutist” (pp. 68, 69). Once more, “our two extremes, creative thought (Gentile) and creative time (Alexander), meet in the demand that true being must engage in progress” (p. 158). The general standpoint of Italian neo-idealism is subjected to a searching criticism which goes (in my opinion) to the root of the vital issues involved. “Sociality, religion, metaphysic, are forms for which the system can find no place” (p. 163); but these demand, in their own inherent nature without being whittled away or transformed, full recognition in any philosophy that merits the name; they call therefore for “an element of stability as well as an element of alteration.” As to where this stability is to be found, the author’s own position is perfectly definite, although its difficulty, until it is fully developed, gives it a superficial quality of paradox. “The whole—the universe—all that in any sense is—can not change. All that is includes all that can be.” Thus we have, at first sight, both the “block universe” of James,⁸ and the *tout est donné* of Bergson; but for Dr. Bosanquet’s counter-arguments to these all too hasty impeachments of absolutism I must refer readers to his own volume, restricting myself to their bearing on the crucial dichotomy between religion and morality. We must distinguish, to begin with, “between a movement within, and a movement or change of, the all, of the ultimate foundation of being as such”;⁹ and this distinction

⁵ *Meeting of Extremes*, p. 126.

⁷ Cf. Green, *Proleg. to Ethics*, p. 57; “neither in time nor in space, immaterial and immovable, eternally one with itself.”

⁸ “The radical misapprehension of English idealism which appears to prevail in recent American writers” inherited from Royce and James (p. 198).

⁹ Pp. 177, 179, 182.

then involves the essential inadequacy of mere moralism, despite the high value of its principles and aspirations so far as these carry us. "Man's perfectibility as realized in the unending series of events is an obvious contradiction." In fundamental contrast with all types of such ethicisms Dr. Bosanquet upholds "a unity in which the finite spirit is at peace, and raised above the moralistic contradiction, in faith by the religious attitude and in speculation by philosophy"; and the most fitting conclusion to my inadequate attempt to present the essence of a rich and profound philosophy is provided by the author's insistence upon "a total perfection, which to approach and apprehend through the finite and its essential nexus with the infinite is the touchstone for a man, for life, and for philosophy."¹⁰ It is to be hoped that his book will further the better appreciation of an idealism that has too long been misrepresented and misunderstood.

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Platonism. PAUL ELMER MORE. Princeton University Press. 1917. Pp. ix + 307.

The Religion of Plato. PAUL ELMER MORE. Princeton University Press. 1921. Pp. xii + 352.

These volumes are announced as the first two of a work having to do with the beginnings and early environment of Christianity. The earlier one is introductory to the other four (three of them being not yet prepared), and of the second, the subject is "the religion of Plato as part of the great spiritual adventure of the ancient world from the death of Socrates to the council of Chalcedon just eight centuries and a half later." These two volumes are not intended to be works in history, and one infers the whole work when completed will not be primarily an historical one. The introductory volume is called by its author rather an invitation to philosophy and to the kind of philosophy that he takes Platonism to be.

The two volumes are naturally controlled, to a great extent, by the subject matter they approach. The philosophy they invite us to practise is austere and elevated, a system of reflections that is evoked by what Mr. More calls dualism and by which he means, I think, any two elements or forces that clash, each one seeking to dominate the other. The most significant of these, and the one to which Plato gave its classical formulation, is the one that includes pleasures as a sequence of states and happiness, the fruit of an enduring organism. Plato's discussion of this dualism in the *Republic* is the heart and center of Platonic wisdom.

¹⁰ Pp. 187, 200, 213.